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OIL AND GAS
EFFECT OF CONVEYANCE OF MINERALS IN PART OF
LEASED TRACT (TEXAS)
In 1949 the Texas Supreme Court was again faced with the
problem indicated by the caption. In Garza v. DeMontalvo,' A, B
and C2 owned a tract of land. They also owned another tract, un-
less a deed by their ancestor validly vested title to the tract in B
and C. A, B and C executed an oil and gas lease covering both
tracts. Later, while this lease was in effect, A, B and C voluntarily
partitioned, a specific tract being set aside to each. No mention
was made in the partition agreement of the outstanding lease.
Thereafter production was secured under the lease upon C's tract.
The court held that all royalties accruing by reason of such pro.
duction were the property of C. The court said that this was so
even assuming that at the time of the lease A, B and C owned one
of the tracts and B and C the other, and assuming that as a result
of the lease the rights to royalties, prior to the partition, were
pooled.
If a mineral deed is executed subsequent to a lease and covers
only a part of the property covered by the lease, but recites that
the grantee shall be entitled to a designated part of royalties pay-
able under the lease, the grantee is entitled to such share even
though production is not upon the portion described in his deed.'
On the other hand, if the clause 'insofar as said lease covers the
above described land" is added, or if the lease is not referred to,
the grantee may be restricted to his own tract, but as to that tract
he may be entitled to the entire fractional share set forth in his
deed. Where the outstanding lease does not contain a provision
pooling royalties, there is a conflict of authority as to whether the
royalties will be pooled when the tract is later divided and is held
1147 Tex. 525. 217 S. W. 2d. 988 (1949).
2 There were actually numerous heirs. The facts have been simplified for con..
venience.
8 Hoffman v. Magnolia, 273 S. W. 828 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
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in severalty by two or more persons.' Where it does contain such
a provision, it has been held that the fractional interest will be
pooled,5 unless, of course, the parties expressly stipulate other-
wise.6
The principal case is the first one in Texas construing a subse-
quent change in ownership under a pooled lease. It should be
noted, however, that pooling impliedly resulted from the owners
of several tracts joining in one lease,7 whereas in the cases holding
that a subsequent grant was subject to pooling, the clause, known
as an "entirety clause" specifically provided fqr this result.
The principal case holds that the transactions in question evi-
denced an intent to limit the interests of each party to his own
tract. It is submitted that the holding should be limited to facts
clearly evidencing such an intention. In the absence of such evi-
dence, it would seem that a more just result would be reached by
construing the instrument as.one providing for pooling under the
existing lease.'
EFFECT ON MINERAL RESERVATION OF PURCHASE AT TRUSTEE'S
SALE BY ASSUMING GRANTEE (TEXAS)
In Cecil v. Dollar,9 Cecil sold an encumbered tract to Blount,
reserving a one-half mineral interest. Blount assumed the debt.
4 Cases on both sides are cited in Carlock v. Krug, 99 P. 2d. 858 (Kan. 1949).
Eason v. Rosamond, 173 Okla. 10, 4.6 P. 2d. 471 (1935).
6 Wilson v. Holn, 164 Kan. 229, 188 P. 2d. 899 (1948).
7 French v. George, 159 S. W. 2d. 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), writ of error refused;
Parker v. Parker, 144 S. W. 2d. 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), writ of error refused.
8 In the more recent case of Grelling v. Allen, 218 S. W. 2d. 896, 898 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949), writ of error refused, N.R.E., the court said:
"We might assume a situation in which Allen, after leasing his 88 acres of land
comprising the five adjoining tracts, divided the entire tract into eighty-eight parcels
of one acre each, and thereafter sold the eighty-eight parcels to various persons, sub-
ject to the lease covering the eighty-eight acre tract. It would hardly be logical, in the
event that a producing well was drilled on one of such one acre tracts, that the owner
of such tract would be entitled to all of the royalty produced from that well. We
think that under such circumstances all of the owners of the one acre tracts would
participate in the royalty produced from a well drilled on any portion of the sub-
divided large tract."
147 Tex. 547, 218 S. W. 2d. 415 (1949).
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Blount later conveyed to Dollar, who also assumed, this deed ex-
cepting the one-half mineral interest. Dollar and the mortgagee
thereafter entered into an extension agreement. Still later, upon
default by Dollar, the property was sold at a trustee's sale at which
Dollar was the purchaser. The present suit was in trespass to try
title by Cecil's widow against Dollar. The appeal involved these
questions: (1) the effect of the extension upon the mineral interest
of Cecil; (2) the extent, if any, of the title acquired by Dollar at
the trustee's sale; (3) as ancillary to the second question, the limi-
tation period applicable to Cecil's right to sue. The court held,
in effect, that the extension bound Cecil's interest, that the purchase
by Dollar inured to Cecil's benefit, and that the interest thus
acquired by Cecil was a present title. Thus, as Cecil did not need
a suit to vest title, the limitation periods applicable to bringing
suit were not a bar.
As to the first point, the court cites and is supported by the
earlier case of Texas Land and Mortgage Co. Ltd. v. Aaron
Cohen.' While in both of these cases the party bound by the exten-
sion reserved an interest, there is a possible inconsistency between
the result reached and the principle sometimes applied that after a
conveyance to one who assumes, the mortgagor's status is that
of a surety, it following that an extension agreement between the
assuming grantee and the mortgagee releases the mortgagor.'
As to the other point, that the purchase by an assuming grantee
inures to the benefit of the grantor's reserved interest, the case
seems to reach a just and correct result. The principle applied
finds its counterpart in the doctrine of after-acquired title' 2 and
the rule that payment of a debt by one primarily liable as to all
other parties operates as a discharge of the debt.
10 138 Tex. 464, 159 S. W. 2d. 859 (1942).
11 Wilson v. J. W. Crowdus Drug Co., 222 S. W. 223 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920);
Hildebrand, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties in Texas, 12 Tex. L. Rev. 125,
152 (1931).
12 W. 0. Cherry v. Farmers Royalty Holding Co., 138 Tex. 576, 160 S. W. 2d. 908
(1942).
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VALIDITY OF REGULATION PROHIBITING FLARING (TEXAS)
The present policy of the Railroad Commission is to prohibit
as far as practicable the flaring or loss of gas from wells produc-
ing both oil and gas. In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Sterling"
the Texas Supreme Court reviewed such an order and held, two
justices dissenting, that under the facts established at the trial, the
order in question was reasonable and valid. The court also held
that the matter was properly presented by a direct appeal to the
supreme court from the Travis County District Court. The opinion
reaffirms the holding of the Hawkins case'4 that an order is valid
if supported by substantial evidence in the trial court; that whether
there was such substantial evidence is a question of law; and that
in determining the question the court will examine the whole
record.
EFFECT OF RESERVATION OF ONE-SIXTEENTH MINERAL
INTEREST (OKLAHOMA)
In the case of Hinkle v. Gaunt" the court was called upon to
construe the following reservation: "Excepting a one-sixteenth
(1/16) interest in the oil and gas deposits that may be developed
on said land, and also an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the
bonus or rental of oil and gas lease now existing against said land,
and the crop rental for the year 1919." The question was whether
in the event of production under an oil and gas lease covering the
one-sixteenth, the owner thereof was entitled to one-sixteenth of the
gross or to one-sixteenth of the royalty reserved in the lease. The
court adopted the latter construction, holding that the owner of
the reserved interest was entitled to one-sixteenth of royalties re-
served in valid leases covering this interest.
Parties dealing with mineral and royalty interests frequently
think of the mineral owner as owning one-eighth. This is because
1 147 Tex. 547. 218 S. W. 2d. 415 (1949).
14 Hawkins v. Texas Co., 146 Tex. 511, 209 S. W. 2d. 338 (1948).
15 -Okla.- , 206 P. 2d. 1001 (1949).
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of the custom in the industry of reserving an eighth royalty to the
mineral owner in an oil and gas lease covering his interest. The
cases now seem fairly uniform in holding that a conveyance of a
mineral interest without reference to existing or future leases con-
veys the designated fraction of royalties reserved in such leases.16
A preliminary problem is whether the deed is a mineral deed or
a royalty deed. Thus, the court in the principal case cited the
earlier Oklahoma case of Swearingen v. Oldham," which involved
this reservation: "The grantors reserve to themselves one-sixteenth
(1/16) of all oil, gas, or other minerals in or under this land
but convey unto grantee full rights to lease this land for any pur-
pose and to collect and retain all rentals and bonuses." The court
apparently construed this as a royalty deed- that is, as one
limited to participation in production. This seems correct. The
mere fact that an interest is called a mineral interest should not
control the substance of the matter: i.e., a royalty interest is one
limited to participation in productiorr; therefore, an interest so
limited is a royalty interest, whatever it may be called.
Granting that a given interest is a royalty interest, should the
same rule be applied to a mineral interest? That is, if a 1/16
mineral interest grants a right to 1/16 of royalties, should a 1/16
royalty interest grant the same right? The argument in favor of
making a distinction is that the parties know, or should know, that
a mineral interest must contribute its proportionate share to the
interest of the lessee, whereas the owner of the royalty interest is
not even a necessary party to the lease. Apparently the Oklahoma
court would reject this argument. On the other hand, it seems
clear that in Texas a 1/16 royalty interest, or a 1/16 mineral
interest payable as royalty, entitles the owner thereof to that frac-
tion of gross production.'" An interesting question would be pre-
16 See, for example, Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S. W. 2d. 302 (1943).
1? 195 Okla. 532, 159 P. 2d. 247 (1945).
is Watkins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179, 189 S. W. 2d. 699 (1945) ; Brown v. Smith,
141 Tex. 425, 174 S. W. 2d. 43 (1943); see Bellport v. Harrison, 123 Kan. 310, 255
Pac. 52 (1927).
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sented by the grant or reservation of a fractional royalty interest
the denominator of which is a number less than 8-as, for ex-
ample, a one-half royalty interest.
EFFECT OF RESERVATION OF PARTIAL INTEREST UNDER A LEASE
COVERING ONLY A PARTIAL INTEREST (ARKANSAS)
In Pollock v. McAlester Fuel Co.19 the Arkansas Supreme Court
had before it this problem: An oil and gas lease by its express
terms covered an undivided 1/ interest in a 20-acre tract. Near
the end of the printed form the parties inserted a typewritten pro-
vision reading, "The lessors herein expressly reserve unto them-
selves, their heirs or assigns, an undivided 1/16 of 7/,s of the total
oil and gas and other minerals produced, saved and marketed
under the terms of this lease, to be delivered to the lessors free of
cost in tanks or pipelines to which lessee, their heirs, successors
or assigns may connect wells, said interest being commonly known
as 'overiding royalty interest'." The question was whether this pro-
vision reserved to lessors a 1/16 of gross production or a 1/16
of the lessor's 1/, being 1/32 of the gross. The court held that
it reserved 1/16 of 1/2. The basis for this holding was that part
of the last quoted clause which limited payments to "minerals
produced, saved and marketed under the terms of this lease,"
which lease expressly covered only a one-half mineral interest.
The court left open the question whether the partial ownership
clause2" applied to this payment.
The principal case illustrates the importance of two fertile
fields for error or ambiguity in preparing mineral deeds and
leases. The first is usually presented by a mineral or royalty deed.
Many forms include a provision that the grant is subject to a desig-
nated lease, but covers and includes a specified fractional interest
in payments made under the lease. If the lease in turn covers only
19 Ark.-, 223 S. W. 2d. 813 (1949).
20 This is the provision found in all, or practically all, leases to the effect that if
the lessor owns less than the entire fee simple title, rentals and royalties shall be
proportionately reduced.
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